Restatement of the Law of Property by Vance, William Reynolds
December, 1937 
THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 
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All are agreed that the conception of the American Institute of Law 
was not less than splendid. Certainly not since Justinian's time had so im- 
pressive a plan for the formulation of the law of a great people been put 
in execution; and it is improbable that even the imperial government of 
sixth century Byzantium could have provided such munificent financial sup- 
port for the jurists who compiled the Corpus Juris Civilis as that which has 
been provided for the work of The American Law Institute by twentieth 
century private benefaction. The plan, grandly conceived and supported 
with such princely generosity, was set in operation with vigor and skill. 
America's greatest legal scholars and the foremost among her barristers 
and judges were mustered and marshalled in the campaign against the error, 
uncertainty, confusion and conflict hat have so long characterized Amer- 
ican law. Surely no better ordered plan could have been devised for bring- 
ing to bear upon the restatement of American law the best that America 
could afford in scholarship, experience and ability. The administration of 
the enterprise has been vigorous, intelligent and efficient. 
In the field of property law the mountainous machinery of the Insti- 
tute has laboured long and painfully and now produces with official finality 
the first two of the five volumes that are planned. Of work done under 
such high circumstance the profession and the public naturally expect much. 
It is against these great expectations that it must be measured. 
The reader quickly perceives that the black letter formulas are of rela- 
tively little value; that they are sometimes inaccurate, often obscure, and 
always ponderous and dull. But he also soon comes to see that the undoubt- 
edly great merit and value of the work as a contribution to legal literature 
is to be found in those portions of the text that are printed as ancillary to 
the rigidly formulated rules that appear in black letter type. Hard pressed 
by their association with the black letter formulations, these ancillary writ- 
ings assume an unfortunately fragmentary form. They bear such various 
labels as "Introduction", "Note", "Introductory Note", "Historical Note", 
"Special Note", "Scope Note", "Comment", with informative sub-labels 
almost without number, and "Illustration". But however labelled, these 
ancillary writings, together with the monographs,' reflect somewhat brokenly 
t A. B., I892, A. M., I893, Ph. D., I895, LL. B., 1897, LL. D., 1915, Washington and Lee 
University; A. M., I9IO, Yale University; Garver Professor of Law, Yale University; 
author, VANCE ON INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930), CASES ON INSURANCE (2d ed. I930), and articles 
in various legal periodicals. 
i. The successive tentative drafts were accompanied by pamphlets etting forth explana- 
tory notes prepared by the Reporter, and sometimes attended by the dissenting views of 
groups of his advisers. Only a few of these notes, printed "unofficially" as appendices, appear 
in the two volumes now issued, having escaped the operation of the destructive belief that the 
('73) 
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the vast amount of thorough research in American judicial precedent and 
legislation and the wide learning that have gone into the making of these 
books, as well as the Reporter's peculiar and puzzling ingenuity in classify- 
ing and arranging the immense mass of material used. These qualities are 
displayed quite as fully in Chapter 5, which deals with such archaic and 
unimportant interests as estates in fee tail and fee conditional, as in Chap- 
ters 7-I7 (Division III), in which interests of vast importance are treated. 
Yet despite the reader's cheerful recognition of the admirable scholar- 
ship and the extensive research that have entered into the making of this 
work, he lays down the volumes with a distinct sense of disappointment. 
He feels that they will afford little help either to the active profession or 
to the student of law. We shall attempt, as briefly as may be, to indicate 
why the work is disappointing. 
In the first place it is unintelligible to all but the initiated. The termi- 
nology adopted is unfamiliar, esoteric. The style, particularly of the black 
letter rules, is ponderous, redundant, repetitious and therefore tiresome. 
The purpose was undoubtedly, following the argument of the late Professor 
Hohfeld,2 to give a precise and fixed meaning to terms used, and to use 
such terms only in the fixed sense, so that formulas expressed in such de- 
fined terms would have a clear, unambiguous and constant meaning and be 
as interchangeable as the parts of a standardized machine. This purpose 
finds expression in the excessive use of cross references in the text of rules, 
a practice tolerable only in legislative drafting, and the strained effort o 
achieve precision in statement.3 The draftsmen adopted the Hohfeld sys- 
formulas adopted as rules of law could stand upon their own black-faced type and needed no 
explanation. These survivals the reader of these volumes greets joyfully, for with rare ex- 
ceptions they speak the lawyer's language and employ the technique which the lawyer's ex- 
perience has taught him is the only one which will aid him in predicting judicial or adminis- 
trative action. 
2. See HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL EGAL CONCEPTIONS (I9I9). 
3. This straining for precision, so characteristic of the black letter formulations through- 
out these volumes, may be illustrated by quoting ? I24, a reasonably brief declaration. Hav- 
ing occasion to state the familiar ule of modern property law that the owner of a life estate 
may transfer to others the whole or any part of that estate, and that an attempt o transfer a
greater estate is operative to transfer only the estate which he has, the Restatement puts forth 
this wordy pronouncement: 
"(i) Except in such cases as are described in Subsection (2), the owner of an estate 
for life has the power to create any interest in land which includes any or all of the 
rights, privileges, powers and immunities which constitute the estate for life. When 
a person, having only an estate for life, purports to transfer an estate greater than 
the estate for life, his conveyee acquires thereby, as against the owner of a future 
interest in such land, no right, privilege, power or immunity greater than those had 
by the conveyor. 
(2) When the estate for life is limited to end upon some attempted alienation thereof, 
the power described in Subsection (i) is correspondingly curtailed." 
Obviously the exception in subsection (2) is unnecessary, since any power whatever is sub- 
ject to such lawful restrictions a may have been put upon it. And in fact it is not true that 
the "conveyee" cannot acquire any "right, privilege, power or immunity greater than those 
had by the conveyor." The lessee for years who holds under the life tenant, whose estate 
ends because of the voluntary termination by the lessor of his own life estate, has the privi- 
lege, and right, of harvesting the growing crops, while the life tenant has not. Debow v. Col- 
fax, io N. J. L. I28 (I828); 2 BL. COMM. *I24. 
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tem of correlative legal relations in toto, and then attempted in Chapter i, 
Definition of Certain General Terms, to define other frequently used terms 
with equal precision. This was unfortunate. The use of the Hohfeld 
terminology is greatly helpful in stating specific problems that require nice 
analysis, but it is not suited to descriptive or expository writing addressed 
to even such a specialized portion of the public as the members of the bar and 
the bench. Lawyers and judges do not in fact understand the Hohfeld 
system, and one suspects that even the restaters have their difficulties with 
it: 4 the Restatement of Torts uses the terms "duty" and "interest" in 
senses quite remote from the meanings given them by the Restatement of 
Property.5 Incidentally, it is well to note that nothing so well gives the 
impression of futile pedantry as to see a long row of "rights, privileges, 
powers and immunities" set into a descriptive paragraph when some single 
word, such as "interest", will better express the meaning intended. In Sec- 
tion I24 we find two of these sonorous scales in one paragraph. So the 
other broader terms, especially those given specialized definitions unfamiliar 
to the profession, have confused readers and given the draftsmen an illu- 
sion of certainty which is harmful.6 This was clearly brought out during 
the discussion at the annual meeting of the Institute in I936, where it was 
evident that some of the most active participants, including some of the 
Reporter's advisers, did not understand the meaning intended to be con- 
veyed by the terms used.7 Words can have only such meaning as usage 
gives them; and words addressed to lawyers must carry the meaning that 
professional usage warrants. Esoteric expressions are used at peril. For 
example, the phrase "right of entry for condition broken" has been in fa- 
miliar use by lawyers for upwards of three centuries.8 Its meaning, de- 
limited by hundreds of judicial decisions, is as nearly clear and constant as 
the meaning of any legal term can be. But this useful and familiar expres- 
sion is discarded for the wholly unfamiliar and inherently ambiguous "power 
of termination",9 used throughout the Restatement. The unconvincing rea- 
son given for this substitution is, in brief, that the interest in question is a 
4. See, for example ?? II9-I23, where "privilege" is used when "right" was intended al- 
though the correct term was used in ?? II7, II8. See also ? 20I (2), where "privilege" is 
used for "power". In ? 24, Special Note, grievous inaccuracy in applying the Hohfeld system 
may have induced one of the Restatemcnt's gratuitous mistakes, the substitution of "power 
of termination" for "right of entry for condition broken". 
5. See Director's Notes, pp. 4, II. 
6. See Division III, Introduction, p. 5I7, where this is written of the bewildering terms 
there defined: ". . . there is a definitive chapter . . . which establishes a clear terminol- 
ogy for the whole Division." "The exact rule stated in a Section employing one of these terms 
depends upon the meaning of that term." Id. at 5I9. Elsewhere the Reporter wisely said: 
"I find definitions difficult to frame and substantially useless when framed." II PROC. AM. 
L. INST. (I933) I22. 
7. See I3 id. (1936) I59, I77. 
8. See Division II, Introductory Note, p. 37, with reference to the term "freehold": 
"The continued use of a term derived from history so long past is justified by the persistent 
consequences of that distant past upon the framework of present law." 
9. Defined in ? 24, comment b, ? I55. 
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"power" and not a "right", and, secondly, that under modern law no entry 
is necessary.'0 One need not be an expert Hohfeldian to know that a right 
of entry for condition broken, like most important property interests, is an 
aggregate of many legal relations. Some of them are rights.1" Also powers 
other than that of terminating the possessory estate may be included.12 
The substitute phrase, "power of termination", besides being artificial and 
unfamiliar, is also ineptly chosen in that it is equally descriptive of numerous 
other oft recurring powers, such as powers of appointment, or of revoca- 
tion, or the power of a disseisee to terminate the interest of the disseisor 
by ouster. 
With equal unwisdom the familiar expression "contingent remainder" 
is discarded for "remainder subject to a condition precedent". The reasons 
given for the substitution are that the term "contingent remainder" has 
"become uncertain as to its exact meaning when used",13 and that the sub- 
tituted phrase makes more apparent the substantial identity of this variety 
of remainder and executory interests.14 Surely the term "contingent re- 
mainder", which comes to us attended by some five centuries of history 
and defining precedents, and which is deeply embedded in the legislation 
and literature relating to property law, has a much more definite connota- 
tion than "condition precedent", which is one of the most versatile and elu- 
sive terms of the law. The Restatement makes no attempt o define a con- 
dition precedent, and the one descriptive statement 15 would seem to imply 
the adoption of the New York statutory definition,16 under which it was 
held by the New York Court of Appeals that a remainder clearly contin- 
gent was vested,17 quite contrary to the common law decisions.18 The con- 
cept which ordinarily bears the label "contingent remainder" is essentially 
a complex and difficult one, but it will not be made any simpler or less diffi- 
cult by changing its label. 
Such petty verbal misadventures, which so easily work themselves into 
errors of substance, are numerous in this Restatement, but space may be 
taken to refer to only one other, more petty still. That is the wholly need- 
less substitution of "conveyor" and "conveyee" for the familiar grantor 
and grantee. Now lawyers might have used these terms, just as they might 
have used the Greek derivatives which are found in Professor Kocourek's 
Io. See ? 24, Special Note. 
ii. E. g., the right to be protected against equitable waste, ? 193, comment c. 
12. E. g., the power to release, or sometimes to transfer. On the latter power, see ?? i6o, 
I6I. 
13. See ? I57, Note on Terminology, p. 542. 
14. Ibid. 
15. "When a limitation creates a remainder and it is not possible to point to any person 
and to say such person would take, if all interests including a prior right to a present interest 
should now end, this remainder is subject to a condition precedent." ? 157, comment u. 
i6. See N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 51, ? 40. 
17. Moore v. Littel, 4I N. Y. 66 (I869). 
i8. See Smaw v. Young, IO9 Ala. 528, 546, 20 SO. 370, 377 (1895). 
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Jural Relations,'9 or they might have found appropriate words in Esperanto, 
but in fact they have not done so. Neither "conveyor" nor "conveyee" is 
to be found in any of the dozen law lexicons accessible to the writer. Neither 
is it to be found in that all embracing publication, Words and Phrases. The 
use of "convey" 20 as a colorless word is well enough, but the gratuitous use 
of these barbarous derivatives is a sin against the Holy Ghost that can 
scarcely be forgiven. 
Another instance of the gratuitous infraction of that basic principle 
of public policy that no writer should use language in such a way as need- 
lessly to injure his reader is the Restatement's "damnable repetition" of the 
phrase "otherwise ffective" conveyance. The apology which is given 21 for 
such unspeakably bad style cannot be accepted. Wherever the word convey- 
ance is used, we are told, entirely unnecessarily, that it is "an otherwise 
effective" conveyance, save in a few instances where a blessed oversight of 
the draftsman has dropped it out.22 Occasional relief is found in the use of 
the word "transfer" 23 in the sense of "effective conveyance". Even the leg- 
islatures are maligned with this dreadful phrase. Thus in Section 39 we 
read "Where a statute provides that an otherwise ffective conveyance cre- 
ates an estate in fee simple . . . ." Then follow references to the statutes 
of some thirty-seven states. Now one would scarcely set up the ordinary 
American statute as a model of style, but he is glad to do the statutes the 
justice of saying that not one of them says anything about "otherwise ffec- 
tive conveyances". Legislative draftsmen are often prodigal in the use of 
superfluous words, but, after all, there is a limit. 
We must not continue with these petty complaints regarding the style 
in which these volumes are written, although it is well for even restaters 
to remember that much of the reputation of Maitland, Holmes and Cardozo 
is due to the charming style that graces their writings; and, furthermore, 
one naturally wishes to explain why the reading of this Restatement is so 
tiresome. But the reader does wonder, in view of the fact that the Re- 
statement must be selective, many important opics being omitted, why so 
much space is used in elaborating the obvious. For example, is it necessary 
that we be told that there is no dower in a life estate; 24 or that "a future 
interest created as an estate for life measured by the life of the owner 
ceases on his death"; 25 or that a defeasible fee that ceases to be defeasible 
Ig. This book, published in 1927, propounds a new system of legal terminology which is 
separated from the Hohfeld system by what is admittedly a wide gap. See KOCOUREK, JURAL 
RELATIONS (1927) x. 
20. See ?ii. 
21. See ? II, comment c, ? 107, comment b. 
22. See, for examples, ? 29, comment f, ? 31. 
23. This term is defined in ? I3. 
24. See ? 128. 
25. Ch. 9, Scope Note, p. 605. In ? go we are told with portentous formality that one 
having an estate terminating with his life has no power to devise his interest. Also, the fol- 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.25 on Sat, 31 May 2014 18:18:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
I78 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 
becomes indefeasible; 26 or that the owner of a legal life estate is liable to 
have his interest taken by his creditors,27 or by the state in eminent do- 
main? 28 Finally, the reader should be told that if he will read the Proceed- 
ings of the Institute for the year I933 29 he will learn that the strange term 
"escrow deliveree" 30 does not mean the person to whom the deed is deliv- 
ered in escrow as one would suppose, but the grantee to whom it is not de- 
livered. 
In appraising the quality and value of this work it is necessary to take 
into the account the handicaps under which it was produced. In the manner 
of the work itself, these will be neatly catalogued. 
i. The task undertaken was impossible from its inception. There is 
no "American law of property", and there can be none so long as the 
present federal system of government persists. 
2. The plan of the Restatement is based upon the misconception that 
"the law" is static and capable of formulary statement; that it is subject to 
still photography. 
3. Such misconception wrought confusion in the minds of the drafts- 
men. They do not have any objective clearly in mind. They admit they 
are not legislating, and yet approach their task as would timid code drafts- 
men, with resulting inconsistencies and repugnancies. 
First, then, as to the feasibility of restating, or even of stating, "the 
living American law" of property. One sufficiently learned might state the 
English law of property of Coke's day, but he could not state the law that 
governed the contemporary Pilgrims as they took up their land at Plymouth. 
He might state the property law of modern England, or of Massachusetts, 
or even of New York or California, but there is no property law of the 
United States to be stated.31 A commercial transaction streaming across 
state lines may perhaps carry with it some part of the law and customs of 
the state of its origin. There is even a general commercial law recognized 
by the federal courts. But not so of property law. That stops at the border. 
The state court determines the property law of the state. This rule goes so 
far that when the Supreme Court of the United States had passed 32 upon 
a title to land in Nebraska before the question at issue had come before 
the state court, in a subsequent case 33 involving the same title it was com- 
lowing statement found in ? 124, comment c, seems fairly obvious: "When the estate for life 
is limited in duration to the continuance of the life of the owner, any attempted testamentary 
disposition by him is of slight significance." No less obvious are ?? I05, io6. 
26. See ? 58. 
27. See ? I47. 
28. See ? I48. 
29. See ii PROC. AM. L. INST. (I933) I24. 
30. See Division III, Introduction, p. 517. 
3I. In ? I62, comment a, mention is made of "the American law" (p. 587), and later (p. 
588) "The American law" is contrasted with "The English law". 
32. Giles v. Little, I04 U. S. 29I (i88i). 
33. Roberts v. Lewis, I53 U. S. 367 (I894). 
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pelled to repudiate its own previous decision and follow the Nebraska Su- 
preme Court, which had not seen fit to approve the judgment of the fed- 
eral court.34 Therefore the restaters were confronted at the very outset 
with a hopeless dilemma. They must either gather up the residual frag- 
ments of Coke's common law or of some less worthy forms of local un- 
written law which they might find lying around in the various states, and 
attempt from these fragments and some handy statutes to construct a sys- 
tem of American law, or they must, with some regard for common law 
precedents and statutory trends, construct a system of rules which in their 
judgment as to desirable social policies "ought" to be enforced by the Amer- 
ican courts, even if in fact they are not. Either course would seem to be 
rather silly; but in fact the restaters have attempted to do both with the 
result that the "restatement" as formulated oes not either state or restate 
the law of any place in the world, or even of Utopia. 
Secondly, this confusion of mind, this split purpose, has produced some 
strange results. For example, take the treatment of entails and fees con- 
ditional. In a few of the American states 35 the fee tail is still afloat, but 
quite out of commission, while the fee conditional is but a museum piece. 
It has about the same relation to "living American law" as has a dinosaur's 
skeleton to the American cattle industry. Yet we find no fewer than ten 
sections 36 given exclusively to the statement of the American law of fees 
conditional and nine others 37 jointly treating of fees conditional and fees 
tail, a total of 70 pages, or nearly seven per cent of the text so far issued. 
Now in fact this treatment of fees conditional is based almost exclusively 
on cases from South Carolina, which quite early discovered that it had 
never adopted the Statute De Donis,38 which abolished the fee conditional 
in England six hundred and fifty ears ago. It is true that a few cases in 
Iowa, one in Oregon and some dicta in Nebraska 39 have recognized the fee 
conditional as an existing estate, but these were cases in which the applica- 
tion of this resurrected rule afforded an easy rationalization of solutions 
which the courts regarded as just and in harmony with the intent of the 
grantor. The same results might easily have been attained by construc- 
tion without reference to fees conditional. 
There can be no question but that the treatment of this bit of juristic 
archaeology on exhibit in South Carolina is scholarly, ingenious and inter- 
esting. As an article in a legal periodical it would merit high praise, but 
34. See Little v. Giles, 25 Neb. 3I3, 32I (I889). 
35. These are Delaware, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Wyoming. In 
Special Note 2, p. 203, the present status of estates tail in the American states is admirably 
described. 
36. Sections 68-77. 
37. Sections 59-67. 
38. Stat. De Donis Conditionalibus, I285, I3 EDW. I, C. I. 
39. All cases are cited in Special Note i, P. 202. 
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as a statement of an integral part of the modern American property law it 
is ridiculous to the point of incredibility. 
The extended and excellent reatment of American estates in fee tail, 
by far the most thorough and scholarly yet published, has more justifica- 
tion because of the volume of case and statute law involved. But even so, 
it is badly overdone. As an element of modern American law the estate 
tail is wholly outmoded, but there are some half dozen states in which it 
must occasionally be taken into account, while the skeletal remains of the 
dead estate not infrequently turn up in other states. But even so it could 
be regarded as an element of "living American law" only if the restaters 
considered their function to be to gather up common law remains wherever 
found, or to restate the law of particular states. Surely they could not 
restate the law as they think it ought to be in the form it now takes in 
Sections 59, 68 and 78. These sections declare, in effect, that if a con- 
veyance to a person and the heirs of his body comes up for construction 
in a state which has not by statute or judicial decision changed the com- 
mon law rule, it must hold that the grantee takes a fee tail or a fee con- 
ditional, according to whether the court of the state is or is not of the opin- 
ion that the state's pioneers brought he Statute De Donis with them in their 
covered wagons along with the rest of the applicable common law. But 
whatever purpose may have been in the minds and hearts of the restaters, 
the net result of the rules laid down in the sections cited is that if the six 
states which have not yet been called upon to determine the effect of such 
a limitation 40 are really awaiting the guidance of the Institute they must 
find that a fee tail or a fee conditional has been created and go back into 
the common law of England either two centuries or six centuries, in order 
to determine the incidents of the estate selected. One doubts such action, 
and entertains the suspicion that if and when such a case arises in one of 
these states, it will give little heed to the Restatement, but decide the issue 
raised in such a manner as to carry out what the court understands to be 
the expressed intent of the parties, rationalizing the decision probably in 
terms of fee simple, as has already been done in Maryland 41 and New 
Hampshire,42 or possibly in terms of fee conditional or fee tail, if these 
concepts be found better suited to their purpose.43 
Chapter 5, dealing with Fees Tail and Related Estates, illustrates bet- 
ter, perhaps, than any other in these volumes the impossibility of mummify- 
ing the living rules of law by wrapping them about with formulas. The 
narrative, descriptive, and expository portions of this chapter, appearing 
40. These are Alaska, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, Utah and Washington. See Ch. 5, 
Introductory Note, p. 2I0. 
4I. Posey's Lessee v. Budd, 2I Md. 477 (I864) (decided under statute). 
42. Jewell v. Warner, 35 N. H. I76 (I857). 
43. Cf. Ewing v. Nesbitt, 88 Kan. 708, I29 Pac. II3I (I9I3). 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.25 on Sat, 31 May 2014 18:18:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY i8i 
in the Introductory Note,44 the excellent special notes, and some of the 
comments, are interesting and admirable, exhibiting the highest type of 
careful research and clear exposition. But the pontificating black letter 
formulas, purporting to declare the law, are worthless, and even mislead- 
ing. If a black letter formula needs must be written, it would be far bet- 
ter to substitute for Sections 59, 68 and 78 some such simple statement 
as this: "Any limitation in a proper conveyance, which under the rules of 
the common law was held to create an estate in fee tail, general or special, 
is deemed to create an estate in fee simple absolute." Of course this is not 
a statement of a uniform rule of American property law, for there is no 
such rule and no such law to be stated; but it expresses much more accu- 
rately the prevailing present practice and the modern trend in America than 
do the black letter sections cited above. And it would also have the ad- 
vantage of not forcing an innocent court, like that, say, of the state of 
Washington, to make a hard choice between a fee conditional and a fee tail. 
This schizophrenic attitude of the restaters in regard to the objective 
sought in formulating the rigid rules in black letters causes vacillation and 
confusion elsewhere in the Restatement. Sections I59 and i6o deal with 
the assignability of possibilities of reverter and of rights of entry for con- 
dition broken, respectively. Now it is clear that, for reasons good enough 
in Coke's time, neither of these interests was assignable at common law. 
It is equally clear that the reasons given for prohibiting their assignment 
are no longer operative, and the change of policy is indicated by statutes 
in a dozen states 45 declaring, expressly or implicitly, that such interests are 
assignable. The slender list of pertinent non-statutory judicial decisions 
found in this country follows the English common law rule as to both inter- 
ests. And yet in Section I59 it is declared that possibilities of reverter are 
freely assignable, while in Section i6o the right of entry for condition broken 
is declared to be non-assignable except as stated in Section i6i. Now why 
do the restaters act this way? The question puzzles the restaters them- 
selves.46 In Tentative Draft No. 4, Section 201 (now i6o), comment a, 
they followed judicial precedents as to the non-assignability of such rights 
of entry, but balked when it came to the half dozen or so cases in four or 
five states which uniformly hold or assert that an abortive attempt o assign 
such rights operates to extinguish them. It was declared that such an at- 
tempt did not destroy the right. The Reporter stated on the floor of the 
annual meeting of the Institute in I933 that the case law was all to the 
contrary, but the draftsmen thought the law "ought" to be as stated. A 
44. Pp. 201-21I. The introductory notes to Division III, pp. 505-518, and Ch. II, pp. 
649-654, are also especially illuminating and valuable. 
45. See ? i6o, Special Note, for a list of these states. 
46. See Leach, The Restatements as They Were in the Beginning, Are Now and Per- 
haps Henceforth Shall Be (I937) 23 A. B. A. J. 517, 519. 
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motion made to strike out the "not" in comment c, so as to bring it into 
accord with judicial precedent, such as it is, precipitated one of the most 
interesting and extended discussions yet held in the Institute meetings. The 
members found themselves face to face with the question of what the Insti- 
tute was really trying to do. The Institute lawyers are distinctly not of the 
defeatist ype. They could scarcely be expected to admit that in the 
Restatement of Property the Institute was attempting the impossible. But 
what? The reporter admitted that he thought he rule announced by Section 
20I (I60) was anachronistic and rather absurd.47 "But after all," said 
the President, Mr. Wickersham, "our business is to state the law" for "we 
are not legislating." 48 He even thought "It may be helpful to state what 
is a recognized principle of law in such clear and distinct form that its bad 
nature may become apparent." 49 The Director was of opinion that the In- 
stitute should function as a sort of supernal court. He said it was "trying 
to decide what would be decided by a court today, not several years ago, or 
several years in the future" 5r if the question were well presented by com- 
petent counsel. A distinguished judge from Kansas was troubled by the 
absence of moral judgments from the text of the Restatement. "Unless", 
said he, "it is made more clear [that the Institute does not approve some of 
the rules formulated as the law] than it is now, the Restatement we now 
have before us will mislead future generations of lawyers and judges 
.. l At the conclusion of the discussion, the draftsmen were reversed 
by a vote of 4I to 35,52 and the rule as now stated on page 577 of the official 
publication became "the law".53 That the smart of this reversal carried 
over is indicated by the language used by the Reporter three years later in ex- 
pressing his opinion of the rule and of the method by which it was adopted: 
"I have drawn Comment c in accord with the direction made by the Annual 
Meeting of I933. It is as indefensible a rule as can be formulated in 
words".54 It is not really quite so bad as the Reporter declares; but the 
whole incident is highly illuminating as to the nature and quality of the 
Restatement. 
47. II PROC. AM. L. INST. (I933) I52. He went on to say that to state the rule as it 
now appears in ? i6o would be to "crystallize worn out rules and perpetuate them in jurisdic- 
tions that have not yet been foolish enough to adopt them." 
48. Id. at I42. 
49. Id. at I46. 
50. Id. at I47. 
5I. Id. at I48. 
52. Id. at I58. It will be noted that the ratio of the majority to the minority is much 
less than 5 to 4. How long will a formula so made stand alone? 
53. The law making illusion is very insidious. Thus in the Explanatory Note accompany- 
ing Tentative Draft No. 4 (I933), at p. xi6, we read: "It is material whether the formalistic 
reasoning of five American states is to be crystallized in this Restatement as the present Amer- 
ican law for forty-eight s ates." The Reporter should comfort himself, for the dozen states 
that have enacted statutes rendering rights of entry assignable are probably quite safe. Only 
thirty-six remain exposed; and it is possible that if and when the question is presented, they 
may not follow the Restatement. 
54. 13 PROC. AM. L. INST. (1936) i98. 
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Only one other illustration of this split purpose may be given. Section 
27, somewhat ambiguously, declares that, with reference to deeds of con- 
veyance, the same rule prevails in modern American law as in Littleton's 
time, the fifteenth century; that no fee simple is created unless the magic 
word "heirs" is used in the limitation. That such is the meaning of Section 
27 is made clear by the illustrations in comment b, where we are told that 
such limitations as "to B forever" and "to B in fee simple" give B no more 
than a life estate. As if this remarkable statement were not sufficiently 
stated when once stated, it is restated in obverse fashion, but with greater 
ambiguity, in Section io0: "An estate for life is created in an existent per- 
son by an otherwise ffective conveyance to one or more natural persons, 
when such conveyance fails to specify effectively the type of estate which 
the conveyor intended to create." By the aid of Illustration 2 in comment 
b we learn that this means that a limitation in a deed "to B in fee simple" 
gives the poor wretch but a life estate. The Reporter admitted that the rule 
was absurd,55 but he felt bound by certain quite positive statements in judi- 
cial decisions 56 so to declare "the law", and in this position he was upheld 
by a vote of the Institute in annual session. 
But after thus setting "the living law" upside down in conscientious 
regard for a shadowy showing of obsolescent and doubtful precedents, the 
Restatement, in Section 240, without benefit of statute, forthwith abolished 
the common law doctrine of the destructibility ofcontingent remainders. It 
could not be denied that the doctrine flourished in England until abolished 
by statute,57 or that many of the American States had found it desirable to 
enact statutes changing the common law rule, while some half dozen other 
states hold the rule to be still operative and yet others have, more or less 
unnecessarily, declared it to be in force. The non-statutory authority sup- 
porting the Restatement is fairly slender,58 but there the black letter rule 
stands as the law, because to state the rule otherwise would be the "embalm- 
ing and preservation of an anachronism".59 Well enough; but why preserve 
those other anachronisms, the non-assignability of rights of entry for con- 
dition broken (Section i6o), and the magic quality of the word "heirs" 
(Section 27) ? 
However, it was in formulating Sections 54 and 84 that the natural 
tendency of all good men to engage in wishful aw-making broke all bounds, 
completely discarding the slogan "We state the law as we find it." It all 
55. In the Explanatory Note printed in Tentative Draft No. i (I929), at p. 5, the Re- 
porter says "That such a rule is at the present ime a socially undesirable one, that it repre- 
rents a survivorship of the formalism of the earlier days of the common law, is undisputed." 
56. The cases cited do not convince the author that the rule announced in ? 27 would be 
accepted as "the living law" in a single one of the American states unless it harmonized with 
the found intent of the grantor. See Tentative Draft No. I (I929), Explanatory Note, pp. 
5-30. 
57. 8 & 9 Vicr. c. io6 (1845). 
58. The authorities and statutes are admirably set out in Tentative Draft No. 6 (I935) 
186-200. 
59. Id. at I92. 
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came about because of those obsolescent life estates, dower and curtesy.60 
In dealing with life estates, the restaters refrained from discussing dower 
and curtesy because they are failing estates, and adequate treatment would 
require an excessive amount of time and space.61 But when they came to 
treat estates in defeasible fee simple, in fee conditional and in fee tail, they 
could not keep their hands off these failing estates. Hence we have Sections 
54, 75, 84, and 93, together with an explanatory note, or monograph,62 to
justify them. The thesis of all these sections, which are too long and too 
repetitious to be quoted within the limits of an article such as this, is that 
logically dower and curtesy are necessarily derivative states, being provi- 
sions made for the surviving spouse from the assets of the deceased spouse. 
It therefore follows by a necessary logical process, so the restaters think, that 
any condition inherent in the original creation of an inheritable estate which 
operates to terminate the owner's interest will also terminate the dower or 
curtesy interest of the surviving spouse. Hence we are told (Section 54) 
that the dower or curtesy interest of a surviving spouse cannot survive the 
defeasance of the deceased spouse's defeasible fee, or (Section 75) the termi- 
nation of his fee conditional, or (Section 84) the termination of his estate 
in fee-tail, by his death without surviving issue. We shall take the space to 
discuss Section 54 only as it applies to fees defeasible by the vesting of a 
shifting executory devise or use, and Section 84 as it applies to estates in fee 
tail terminating by the tenant's death without surviving issue. We need not 
discuss Section 75, dealing with fees conditional, for in this aspect of the 
rule stated it is purely the product of the restaters' imagination. There 
could be no English common law precedents, and none are to be found in 
South Carolina or elsewhere.63 
Among other things Section 54 declares that if a gift of land be made 
to A and his heirs, with the proviso that if A shall die without issue him 
surviving, the land shall pass to B and his heirs, and A dies leaving no issue, 
his widow is not entitled to dower. For such a statement here exists 
scarcely a shadow of support, while a considerable mass of decisions from 
eleven states is unequivocably opposed to it.64 The Reporter says that Ala- 
bama, Georgia and Ohio support he rule stated,65 but he is mistaken. Of 
the three cases cited by him in support of his statement, he only one that 
6o. In the interest of brevity, reference is hereafter made to dower only, although some 
of the cases cited involved curtesy. 
6i. See Ch. 6, Scope Note, p. 330. 
62. See Appendix, p. i. 
63. See Appendix, p. I2. "Upon the foregoing state of authority there seems to be no 
adequate reason for stating the law other than as it is stated in ? 75. The Institute found its 
position not bound by authority and has stated the rule required by the closest available 
analogies." Thus ? 93 need not be discussed. There are no decisions supporting the rule 
stated, which is of extremely small importance. 
64. See Appendix, p. 7, note i8. A twelfth state, Alabama, might well have been added. 
See Carter v. Couch, 157 Ala. 470, 47 So. ioo6 (I908). 
65. See Appendix, p. 7, and cases cited in note ig. 
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considers the problem is Edwards v. Bibb.66 This much cited case, decided 
by the Alabama Supreme Court in I875, was shortly afterwards repudiated 
in another case involving the construction of a different provision of the 
same will.67 A comparatively recent Alabama decision 68 followed the gen- 
eral rule allowing dower. Edwards v. Bibb was not even cited. In the 
other two cases cited from Georgia 69 and Ohio 70 the widow claimed as 
statutory heir and not as dowress. The Georgia court made no mention 
of dower but denied the widow's claim as statutory heir to any interest 
in the divested fee of her deceased husband. The opinion in the Ohio case, 
Smith v. Hankins, barely mentioned ower, and counsel seem not to have 
claimed it; in the only other reported decision found in that jurisdiction, 
rendered by a nisi prius court sitting in Cincinnati,71 no reference was made 
to Smith v. Hankins, and though the Court denied the widow's claim of 
dower in a divested fee, it remarked that a different result would ensue if 
the fee were divested by the shifting of the estate upon the husband's death 
without issue. 
This very shadowy support in judicial precedent is somewhat strength- 
ened by the disapproval of the prevailing rule by several text writers of rec- 
ognized authority.72 They criticized the rule applied by the courts, as does 
the Reporter, on the ground that it was illogical and inconsistent with the 
rule of decision in analogous situations. The Reporter also seeks to weaken 
the authority of the substantially unbroken array of precedents opposed to 
the rule adopted in Section 54 by disparaging the legal education of Lord 
Mansfield, who decided the case of Buckworth v. Thirkell,73 in which the 
prevailing rule was first announced. He urges that we remember "That 
Lord Mansfield was a Scotch lawyer whose training had stressed the Civil 
Law." 74 Little is known about the legal education of the Scotch youth, 
William Murray, who later went to London to become the leader of the 
English bar, and later to rule, as primate of English judges, for over thirty 
years, but it is extremely unlikely that his early exposure to Scotch law had 
anything to do with his decision of Buckworth v. Thirkell. While Scotch 
law recognizes an interest similar to dower, which the Scotch call "terce", 
it is improbable that any Scotch lawyer in William Murray's Edinburgh 
days had ever heard of the problem presented in the Buckworth case. In- 
deed, an examination of the Scot-s Digest seems to show that the widow's 
66. 54 Ala. 475 (I875). 
67. Bibb v. Bibb, 79 Ala. 437 (I885). 
68. Carter v. Couch, 157 Ala. 470, 47 So. ioo6 (I908) (see also supra note 64). The 
Restatement appears to have overlooked this case. 
69. Daniel v. Daniel, 102 Ga. i8i, 28 S. E. I67 (I897). 
70. Smith v. Hankins, 27 Ohio St. 371 (I875). 
71. Myers v. Moore, 12 Ohio Dec. (N. P.) 805 (I884). 
72. See Appendix, pp. 8-ii, where quotations are printed. 
73. Reported in note in Doe ex dem. Andrew v. Hutton, 3 B. & P. 643, 652 (C. P. I804). 
74. Reporter's monograph, Appendix, p. 5. 
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claim of terce in a defeasible fee subject to an executory interest has not even 
yet been considered by a Scottish court. It is probable that any one seeking 
to approach the decision of Buckworth v. Thirkell on the pedagogic level 
would do better to look into the legal education of counsel who argued that 
case. An even better course for the restaters would be to forget about 
Lord Mansfield's legal education and look to the social and economic func- 
tion of the dower device itself. 
If the authority supporting the rule declared to be law in Section 54 
is thus seen to be shadowy, there is no authority at all to support the rule 
stated (by no stretch of the imagination could it be said to be restated) in 
Section 84, denying dower to the widow of the tenant in tail who dies with- 
out surviving issue. The English practice and case law is all opposed to 
the Restatement, as is the limited precedent and practice in this country.75 
The Reporter explains this astounding feat of restating such law as 
never was in this fashion. "We have proceeded generally in this country 
upon the belief that dower and curtesy are derivative states and we shall 
be performing the proper function of the Institute in frowning upon a 
departure from symmetry when such departure serves no discoverable pres- 
ent objective and is not so heavily imbedded in American decisions as to 
demand perpetuation as a rule of property. Sections 84 and 93 of this 
Restatement embody the views thus explained and justified." 76 Even if 
it be admitted that the settled rules set aside by Sections 54 and 84 offend 
the restaters' sense of symmetry and logical consistency, their attention 
should be called to the fact that after all law can be no more logical than 
life. But these rules set up by the precedents are not illogical. An addi- 
tional factor enters into the case when the dower claim is in a fee defeated 
by the vesting of an executory gift conditioned upon the tenant husband's 
death without issue. So long as dower is continued as a device to provide 
for widows, its assignment from land that has shifted over to another be- 
cause of the unexpected eath of the husband without issue seems quite in 
harmony with its general social function and also with the donor's reason- 
ably inferred intent. The primary gift in fee shows unequivocally the 
donor's intent to benefit he primary donee's issue, if any. It is only in 
the absence of such natural dependents that the property shifts over to the 
secondary donee, who has rarely, if ever, paid value for such uncertain 
interest as the law accords him. The inference that the donor's intent in- 
cludes the customary providence for any widow the primary donee may 
leave is overwhelming. There is usually long wisdom in these century-old 
rules which the Restatement should not idly disturb. Whatever may be the 
right way to make a restatement of property law, it is clear that Sections 54, 
75, 84 and 93 illustrate how not to make it. 
75. This is freely admitted in the Reporter's monograph. See Appendix, pp. I4, I5. 
76. Appendix, p. I5. 
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In laying out the scheme for the Restatement he restaters have very 
naturally attempted to make a classification of the vastly numerous and 
complex relationships with which they must deal that would permit the 
fashioning of a fixed pattern in which every relationship would have its 
proper place and always be properly found in that place; or, to shift the 
figure to one less formal, the restaters have looked upon the law of property 
as a huge picture jig-sawed into thousands of variant pieces and they have 
busily set to worth to fix every piece in its appropriate place. But inasmuch 
as the law of property grew up very much as did Topsy, and not according 
to any fixed pattern or jig-saw puzzle plan, the restaters have found that 
many of the pieces did not fit, necessitating a deal of whittling and planning, 
and some smashing, as we have seen. If we assume that we must have a 
fixed and orderly pattern, then we must expect and accept the whittling and 
reshaping process described above. But this pattern-making process, when 
carried to the vigorous extreme which characterizes this Restatement, in- 
volves other distressing consequences. These are the too frequent state- 
ment of the obvious, since otherwise a gap would appear in the pattern, 
tiresome repetition, and fragmentary treatment of important opics that 
would much better have been treated as a whole and completely. This be- 
comes more clearly apparent if an illustration is given. The first six chap- 
ters of the Restatement rest upon Blackstone's classic classification of estates. 
Under each estate as a heading are treated in orderly succession its "crea- 
tion" and its "characteristics". The latter term is not very aptly substituted 
for "incidents", in customary use among lawyers and law writers, but it 
will do. Now it is obvious that many of these "characteristics" of the sev- 
eral estates will be very much the same, and sometimes too obvious for 
profitable comment. Yet the pattern requirement demands that they be set 
out in ponderous particularity. For examples, alienability, waste and dower 
are set down as characteristic or not characteristic of each of the freehold 
estates. This not only induces solemn declarations, uch as have been previ- 
ously mentioned, so obvious that they are rather ludicrous; but, more sig- 
nificantly, this pattern-writing causes dower rights to be treated in a frag- 
mentary and quite inadequate manner in some half-dozen different places,77 
while the treatment of waste, a highly important and fairly well integrated 
topic, is found scattered about in some twenty-three different and often 
widely separated sections.78 It is to be regretted that the restaters did not 
placate their pattern by the use of cross references as is occasionally done,79 
and state the law of dower and the law of waste as integrated topics. If 
this had been done, possibly they would not have ignored homestead rights. 
77. See ?? 54, 75, 84, 93, I28, comments a, b, ? I34, comment a, ? I53, comment d. Cf. 
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. I920) 725-849. 
78. See ?? 49, 73, 9I, II7, comment C, I38-I46, I49, i87-I94. Cf. TIFFANY, op. cit. supra 
note 77, at 949-994. 
79. See Note at end of Ch. 3, p. II5. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.25 on Sat, 31 May 2014 18:18:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
I88 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 
These plebeian interests did not come over in the Mayflower but sprung 
from the Texas revolution, yet they constitute a very significant element of 
"the living law" of property in the United States. 
What then is the significance of these two volumes of the Restatement 
of the Law of Property viewed as a contribution to the literature of the 
law? And what will be the influence upon the future development of the 
law of property in America of the completed Restatement if the pontifical 
approach is retained in the remaining volumes? The answer must be: very 
little. The black letter rules have no literary merit, and as declarations of 
law, supported only by their own authority, they are absurd. The judge 
who would base his decision of any question of law upon these black letter 
declarations would be worse than lazy; he would be incredibly stupid. Even 
when accurately stated, which is too often not the case, and applicable in the 
jurisdiction, as they often are not, their language is too general to deter- 
mine specific issues arising out of particular fact situations. These decla- 
rations of legal principles, like other non-legislative formulations, can rise 
no higher than their source in the juristic experience of the race, as evi- 
denced by judicial precedents. These are almost wholly lacking in the 
Restatement, which generally discards even such collections of authorities 
as supported the tentative drafts. 
As already stated, the ancillary material attending the black letter rules, 
called notes and comments, while lacking continuity in form and rounded 
completeness of substance, has much greater value. In fact the treatment 
of the mutual rights and duties of owners of future interests and of the 
possessory interests 80 upon which the future interests are expectant, which 
one finds scattered through Chapter 6, entitled Estates for Life, and Chap- 
ters I2-I5, entitled Protections of Different Kinds from Diverse Perils and 
Misfortunes, is quite the most satisfactory and complete treatment known 
to this writer. If the matter here presented in this unfortunately fragmen- 
tary form were presented as an integrated topic and given reasonable sup- 
port in authority cited, it would have undoubtedly great value for all students 
of the law, whether at the bar, on the bench, or in academic cloisters. Is it 
too much to hope that from the vast labors expended in the preparation of 
the rigidly patterned and inflexible Restatement here will come a treatise 
in a form that can be profitably used, adequately supported by cited authority 
and with a terminology integrated with the literature of the law and the 
customary usage of lawyers, a treatise on the law of Property comparable 
to the great works, published and pending, that crown the labors of the 
group who restated the law of Contracts? 
8o. Here again the restaters discard the long used and familiar term "possessory inter- 
est" and substitute for it "present interest". They seem to be caught by the lure of the easy 
contrast of present and future interests, although they recognize (see ? I53, comment e) that 
a vested future right, with enjoyment only postponed, may be as truly a present interest as 
the more immediate and obvious possessory right. 
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